HUDU

Political Economy in Macroeconomics


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kartoniert
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Dezember 2001

Beschreibung

Beschreibung

"Formal models of political economy are today part of the tool kit of every well-trained macroeconomist. There exists no better guide to these models than this colossal book. Allan Drazen is not only a leading practitioner of the art; he is a first-rate expositor. A survey, textbook, and critique all in one, this book informs, teaches, and stimulates. You will not need another book on political economy for some time to come."--Dani Rodrik, Harvard University"This book is magnificent, and is sure to become a standard reference in the rapidly growing field of politics and macroeconomics."--Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University"Drazen's book gives an excellent account of the political dimension of macroeconomic policy. With its careful attention to methodological issues, thorough and balanced presentation of the literature, and clear exposition and perceptive evaluation of models, this book will be valuable both as a reference volume for researchers and a textbook for graduate students."--Avinash Dixit, Princeton University"This book will be a lasting contribution: it will be widely used in graduate courses on the topic, and by whoever wants to learn about these recent developments of economic theory. Its main strengths are clarity of exposition, completeness of treatment, balanced critical evaluation ... and, perhaps most valuable of all, a very successful attempt to integrate the many disparate contributions [to the new political economy] with earlier literature in public choice and public finance, as well with each other."--Guido Tabellini, Universita Bocconi and Centre for Economic Policy Research in London

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface xi Introductory Note xiii PART I: BASIC ISSUES AND TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 1 CHAPTER ONE What is a Political Economy? 3 1.1 Introduction 3 1.2 Politics and Economics 5 1.3 Types of Heterogeneity 9 1.4 An Illustration of Approaches 12 1.5 Plan of the Book 18 CHAPTER TWO Economic Models for Political Analysis 20 2.1 Introduction 20 2.2 The Principal-Agent Problem 22 2.3 Discrete Time Dynamic Models*b2Dynamic Programming 31 2.4 The Overlapping Generations Model 35 2.5 Effects of Uncertain Future Policies 38 2.6 Conclusions 58 CHAPTER THREE Decisionmaking Mechanisms 60 3.1 Introduction 60 3.2 How Much Political Detail? 61 3.3 Choosing Decisionmaking Mechanisms 64 3.4 Direct Democracy 70 3.5 Representative Democracy 77 3.6 Multiparty Systems 85 3.7 Interest Groups and Lobbying 90 3.8 Transaction Cost Politics 96 3.9 Conclusions 98 PART II: COMMITMENT, CREDIBILITY, AND REPUTATION 99 CHAPTER FOUR The Time-Consistency Problem 101 4.1 Introduction 101 4.2 Capital Taxation 104 4.3 Time Inconsistency as a Conflict of Interests 110 4.4 The Barro-Gordon Model 113 4.5 Seigniorage Revenue and the Optimum Quantity of Money 121 4.6 Commitment versus Flexibility 126 4.7 Conclusions 130 CHAPTER FIVE Laws, Institutions, and Delegated Authority 131 5.1 Introduction 131 5.2 Laws, Constitutions, and Social Contracts 132 5.3 Delegation of Authority 140 5.4 Central Bank Independence 142 5.5 Fiscal Structures for Time Consistency 157 5.6 Conclusions 164 CHAPTER SIX Credibility and Reputation 166 6.1 Introduction 166 6.2 Reputation 168 6.3 "Reputation" under Complete Information 169 6.4 Reputation under Incomplete Information--Mimicking 175 6.5 Does Reputation "Solve" the Time-Consistency Problem?--Three Caveats 183 6.6 Signaling 187 6.7 Reputation for Not Reneging on Commitments 195 6.8 Credibility and External Circumstances 201 6.9 Ambiguity, Secrecy, and Imprecise Control 208 6.10 Conclusions 214 PART III: HETEROGENEITY AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 217 CHAPTER SEVEN Elections and Changes of Policymakers 219 7.1 Introduction 219 7.2 Elections and Policymaker Performance 223 7.3 The Opportunistic Political Business Cycle 228 7.4 Partisan Political Cycles 246 7.5 Competence and Prospective Voting 268 7.6 Campaign Promises 278 7.7 Interactions of the Executive and the Legislature 283 7.8 Multiparty Systems and Endogenous Election Dates 293 7.9 Tying the Hands of One's Replacement 300 7.10 Conclusions 308 CHAPTER EIGHT Redistribution 309 8.1 Introduction 309 8.2 Redistribution of Income 311 8.3 Differential Transfers 318 8.4 Nonmonetary Redistribution 324 8.5 Rent Seeking and Predation 334 8.6 Intergenerational Redistribution 345 8.7 Redistribution and Mobility 354 8.8 Conclusions 370 CHAPTER NINE Public Goods 372 9.1 Introduction 372 9.2 Public Goods--The Neoclassical Approach 375 9.3 Provision of Public Goods in Practice 379 9.4 Voluntary Provision of Public Goods--Free Riders and Collective Action 382 9.5 Voluntary Provision of Public Goods--Clubs 391 9.6 The Static Public Goods Game 395 9.7 The War of Attrition in Public Goods Provision 397 9.8 Conclusions 401 CHAPTER TEN Inaction, Delay, and Crisis 403 10.1 Introduction 403 10.2 Economic Arguments 407 10.3 Vested Interests 411 10.4 Nonadoption Due to Uncertainty about Individual Benefits 414 10.5 "Communication" Failures 423 10.6 Conflict over the Burden of Reform 432 10.7 Common Property Models 439 10.8 Economic Crises 444 10.9 Conclusions 454 PART IV: APPLICATION TO POLICY ISSUES 455 CHAPTER ELEVEN Factor Accumulation and Growth 457 11.1 Introduction 457 11.2 Basic Models of Fiscal Policy and Capital Accumulation 461 11.3 Imperfect Capital Markets, Externalities, and Endogenous Income Distribution 474 11.4 Political Institutions and Regimes 488 11.5 Socio-Political Instability 500 11.6 Empirical Determinants of Growth 513 11.7 Conclusions 524 CHAPTER TWELVE The International Economy 526 12.1 Introduction 526 PART I Exchange-Rate Arrangements 529 12.2 Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates 529 12.3 Currency Crises and Contagious Speculative Attacks 536 12.4 Monetary Unions 544 PART II Macroeconomic Interdependence 559 12.5 International Policy Cooperation 559 12.6 Political Responses to External Shocks 579 PART III International Capital and Aid Flows 580 12.7 Capital Controls 580 12.8 Sovereign Borrowing 587 12.9 Foreign Aid 601 12.10 Conclusions 613 CHAPTER THIRTEEN Economic Reform and Transition 615 13.1 Introduction 615 13.2 Defining the Issues 617 13.3 Economic and Political Constraints 621 13.4 The Implications of Magnitude--A Formal Analysis 626 13.5 Heterogeneity and Political Constraints 632 13.6 Labor Reallocation 643 13.7 Privatization 653 13.8 Price Liberalization 663 13.9 Conclusions 674 CHAPTER FOURTEEN The Size of Government and the Number of Nations 675 14.1 Introduction 675 14.2 The Scope of Government 677 14.3 The Size of Government--Government Spending 679 14.4 Government Debt and Deficits 690 14.5 Budgetary Rules and Institutions 697 14.6 The Number of Nations 707 14.7 Conclusions 731 Bibliography 735 AUTHOR INDEX 765 SUBJECT INDEX 771

Portrait

Allan Drazen is Professor at The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, and Professor of Economics at the Center of International Economics at the University of Maryland.
EAN: 9780691092577
ISBN: 0691092575
Untertitel: Sprache: Englisch.
Verlag: University Press Group Ltd
Erscheinungsdatum: Dezember 2001
Format: kartoniert
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