Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
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BeschreibungAn examination of the delegation of authority from state governments to international organizations.
InhaltsverzeichnisPart I. Introduction: 1. Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney; Part II. Variation in Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits: 2. A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney; 3. US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes; 4. Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems Helen V. Milner; 5. Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality Lisa L. Martin; 6. Delegation and discretion in the European Union Mark A. Pollack; Part III. Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability: 7. How agents matter Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby; 8. Screening power: international organizations as informative agents Alexander Thompson; 9. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson; 10. Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity Erica R. Gould; 11. Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power Karen J. Alter; Part IV. Directions for Future Research: 12. The logic of delegation to international organizations David A. Lake and Mathew McCubbins.
PortraitDarren G. Hawkins is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University. David A. Lake is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Daniel L. Nielson is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University. Michael J. Tierney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at The College of William & Mary.
Pressestimmen' ... provides a stimulating contribution to the analysis of international organization ...' Review of Industrial Organization 'Delegation and Agency in International Organization develops a sophisticated Principal-Agent approach to elucidate the sources, limits and consequences of IO autonomy. The volume is unified by thoughtful application of the theory to a range of important cases and also includes more critical perspectives questioning whether PA theory provides an adequate analysis. There is no better statement of how PA models help us understand the importance and operation of international institutions and organizations. It is essential reading for scholars and students who want to really understand international organizations.' Duncan Snidal, The University of Chicago
Untertitel: 'Political Economy of Instituti'. Sprache: Englisch.
Verlag: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PR
Erscheinungsdatum: September 2006
Seitenanzahl: 406 Seiten