The Sources of Normativity
BeschreibungEthical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing how each developed in response to the prior one and comparing their early versions with those on the contemporary philosophical scene. Kant's theory that normativity springs from our own autonomy emerges as a synthesis of the other three, and Korsgaard concludes with her own version of the Kantian account. Her discussion is followed by commentary from G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a reply by Korsgaard.
InhaltsverzeichnisIntroduction Onora O'Neill; Prologue: Excellence and obligation: a very concise history of western metaphysics 387 BC to 1887 AD; 1. The normative question; 2. Reflective endorsement ; 3. The authority of reflection; 4. The origin of value and the scope of obligation; 5. Reason, humanity, and the moral law G. A. Cohen; 6. Morality and identity Raymond Geuss; 7. Universality and the reflective self Thomas Nagel; 8. History, morality and the test of reflection Bernard Williams; 9. Reply Christine Korsgaard; Bibliography; Index.
Pressestimmen"This is a book anyone working in ethics should have on the desk. It is provocative and makes original and major contributions to a defense of a Kantian ethic. The historical developments of the various strands of thought are traced out in clear and helpful style. Korsgaard's writing is itself engaging and clear and her arguments forceful and for the most part compelling. This book constitutes a major advance in ethical theory." L. W. Colter, Review of Metaphysics
Untertitel: Sprache: Englisch.
Verlag: Cambridge University Pr.
Erscheinungsdatum: Juni 1996
Seitenanzahl: 289 Seiten