Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

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Dezember 2003



This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.


Preface; 1. Editor's introduction and overview Alvin E. Roth; 2. Disagreement in bargaining: models with incomplete information Kalyan Chatterjee; 3. Reputations in games and markets Robert Wilson; 4. An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining Robert W. Rosenthal; 5. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Jean Tirole; 6. Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information Ariel Rubinstein; 7. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information Roger B. Myerson; 8. Sequential bargaining mechanisms Peter C. Cramton; 9. The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model Martin J. Osborne; 10. Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions Stef Tijs and Hans Peters; 11. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: a survey of recent results William Thomson; 12. Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining Alvin E. Roth; 13. Bargaining and coalitions K. G. Binmore; 14. Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining Sergiu Hart; 15. A comment on the Coase theorem William Samuelson; 16. Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: who should bear the burden of proof? Joel Sobel; 17. The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives Vincent P. Crawford.
EAN: 9780521267571
ISBN: 0521267579
Untertitel: Sprache: Englisch.
Erscheinungsdatum: Dezember 2003
Seitenanzahl: 404 Seiten
Format: gebunden
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