BeschreibungStrategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
InhaltsverzeichnisInterview with Elisabeth and Reinhard Selten.- On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann.- Working with Reinhard Selten Some Recollections on Our Joint Work 1965-88.- and Survey.- Conceptual Ideas in Game Theory.- A Note on Imperfect Recall.- Futures Market Contracting When You Don't Know Who the Optimists Are.- Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case.- Admissibility and Stability.- Equilibrium Selection in Team Games.- Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games.- Evolutionary Game Theory.- Evolutionary Conflict and the Design of Life.- Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors.- Strict and Symmetric Correlated Equilibria are the Distributions of the ESS's of Biological Conflicts with Asymmetric Roles.- Applications of Non-Cooperative Game Theory.- Recurring Bullies, Trembling and Learning.- Dumb Bugs vs. Bright Noncooperative Players: A Comparison.- Communication Effort in Teams and in Games.- Endogenous Agendas in Committees.- The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach.- Reinhard Selten Meets the Classics.- Equlibrium Selection in Linguistic Games: Kial Ni (Ne) Parolas Esperanton?.- Relating Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game Theory.- Are Stable Demands Vectors in the Core of Two-Sided Markets? Some Graph-Theoretical Considerations.- The Consistent Solution for Non-Atomic Games.- Finite Convergence of the Core in a Piecewise Linear Market Game.- Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths.- Principles in Behavioral Economics.- Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ.- Reciprocity: The Behavioral Foundations of Socio-Economic Games.- Adaption of Aspiration Levels - Theory and Experiment.- A Model of Boundedly Rational Experienced Bargaining in Characteristic Function Games.- Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue.- Experimental Studies.- Naive Strategies in Competitive Games.- Induction vs. Deterrence in the Chain Store Game: How Many Potential Entrants are Needed to Deter Entry.- Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Prisoner's Dilemma Games.- On Styles of Relating to Bargaining Partners.- What Makes Markets Predict Well? Evidence from the Iowa Electronic Markets.- Sequencing and the Size of the Budget: Experimental Evidence.- Intertemporal Speculation under Uncertain Future Demand: Experimental Results.- Endowment Effect for Risky Assets.- List of Contributors.
Untertitel: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1997. Book. Sprache: Englisch.
Erscheinungsdatum: September 2011
Seitenanzahl: 532 Seiten