British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945

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August 2004



Some 60 years after the Far Eastern War ended, this innovative collection brings together five distinguished UK-based scholars and five from Japan to reappraise their respective countries' leadership in the Malaya and Burma campaigns. This leadership is analyzed on various levels, ranging from the grand strategic to operational.
The Japanese contributors examine the reasons for their forces brilliant advances in 1941-42, whereas the British writers have to account for the disastrous defeat, characterized by the poor leadership of senior commanders such as Bennett and Percival. Between 1943 and 1945, the tables were turned dramatically, so the failure of Japanese command decisions then comes under critical scrutiny and the British have to explain how defeat was transformed into victory.
Using both archival and published sources, Japanese scholars are now in a position to reappraise their war leaders, including Tojo and Mutaguchi, from a much more critical standpoint than was possible previously.But it was their flawed command "system," ultimately involving the emperor, that was most at fault.
Although certain aspects of the British campaigns have already received saturation coverage, this book provides new perspectives on the failures of Allied leadership in Malaya and Burma; the morale and fighting spirit of the British forces in the heroic struggle for Imphal and Kohima; and the all-important role of British and US air power. Not least, General Sir William Slim's remarkable achievement as commander of XIV Army is critically assessed but found to be fully deserved. Above all, this volume should stimulate interest in different methods and styles of military leadership inview of the contrasting approaches of the British and Japanese in World War II.


1. Britain's Grand Strategy for War against Japan 2. Tojo Hideki as a War Leader 3. The Army Level of Command: General Sir William Slim and the Fourteenth Army in Burma 4. Leadership in Japan's Planning for War against Britain 5. Crisis of Command: Major-General Gordon Bennett and British military effectiveness in the Malayan Campaign, 1941-42 6. General Yamashita and His Style of Leadership: The Malaya/Singapore campaign 7. British Tactical Command and Leadership in the Burma Campaign, 1941-45 8. Japanese War Leadership in the Burma Theatre: The Imphal Operation 9. British Leadership in Air Operations: Malaya and Burma 10. Air Operational Leadership in the Southern Front: Imperial Army Aviation's trial to be an 'Air Force' in the Malaya offensive air operation


Brian Bond is Emeritus Professor of Military History at King's College London and President of the British Commission for Military History. Festschrift to mark his retirement in 2002, The British General Staff, edited by David French and Brian Holden Reid, was published by Frank Cass and awarded the Templer Prize Medal for Military History. He is author of many books on military history, the most recent being The Unquiet Western Front: Britain's Role in Literature and History (2002). Kyoichi Tachikawa is Senior Research Fellow at the Military History Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, Japan. He was awarded an MA from Sophia University in 1990 and a PhD in 1999.
EAN: 9780714656595
ISBN: 0714656593
Untertitel: 'Cass Series--Military History'. Sprache: Englisch.
Erscheinungsdatum: August 2004
Seitenanzahl: 175 Seiten
Format: gebunden
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